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Traditional research methodologies typically assume that humans operate on the basis of an
“open loop” stimulus-process-response rather than the “closed loop” control of internal state.
They also average behavioral data across repeated measures rather than assess it
continuously, and they draw inferences about the working of an individual from statistical
group effects. As such, we propose that they are limited in their capacity to accurately identify
and test for the mechanisms of change within psychological therapies. As a solution, we
explain the advantages of using a closed loop functional architecture, based on an extended
homeostatic model of the brain, to construct working computational models of individual
clients that can be tested against real-world data. Specifically, we describe tests of a
perceptual control theory (PCT) account of psychological change that combines the
components of negative feedback control, hierarchies, conflict, reorganization, and
awareness into a working model of psychological function, and dysfunction. In brief,
psychopathology is proposed to be the loss of control experienced due to chronic,
unresolved conflict between important personal goals. The mechanism of change across
disorders and different psychological therapies is proposed to be the capacity for the therapist
to help the client shift and sustain their awareness on the higher level goals that are driving goal
conflict, for sufficiently long enough to permit a trial-and-error learning process, known as
reorganization, to “stumble” upon a solution that regains control. We report on data from
studies that have modeled these components both separately and in combination, and we
describe the parallels with human data, such as the pattern of early gains and sudden gains
within psychological therapy. We conclude with a description of our current research program
that involves the following stages: (1) construct amodel of the conflicting goals that are held by
people with specific phobias; (2) optimize a model for each individual using their dynamic
movement data from a virtual reality exposure task (VRET); (3) construct and optimize a
learning parameter (reorganization) within each model using a subsequent VRET; (3) validate
the model of each individual against a third VRET. The application of this methodology to
robotics, attachment dynamics in childhood, and neuroimaging is discussed.
Keywords: functional model, psychotherapy, mechanism of change, Perceptual Control Theory (PCT),
dynamic models
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INTRODUCTION
It is well recognized that randomized controlled trials, in isolation,
cannot identify themechanism of action of a psychological therapy
(1–3). Most commonly, tests of mechanism involve prospective
studies or experimental designs (3, 4). In an earlier review, we
identified a number of fundamental limitations with using these
methods in psychology, despite their almost universal acceptance
(5). In the current article, we will begin by explaining how these
limitations specifically apply to research on the mechanisms of
psychological therapy.We then propose an alternativemethod that
addresses these issues—building and testing computational models
against real-worlddata.Arguably, this is theultimate test of a theory
—that it specifies a working model that has identical properties to
the real system.Wewill share anumberofmethodologies and initial
findings of this work, utilizing an integrative psychological
framework known as PCT (6–9).
WHAT ARE THE LIMITATIONS OF
EXISTING METHODOLOGIES WITHIN
PSYCHOLOGICAL THERAPIES?
A case has been made regarding the limitations of randomized
controlled trials of therapies inbeing able tounderstandhowagiven
psychological intervention has its effects (1–4). Psychological
interventions are typically complex, multifaceted treatments,
and so in a typical controlled trial, it is not clear which of the
various active components of the treatment could account for
any differences. The situation can be improved by tweaking a
certain element of the intervention and comparing the different
versions of the intervention experimentally (3, 4). However,
there is little evidence that this approach has yielded insights
into more effective treatments (10). The element of trial and
error in this process means progress is likely to be slow and
expensive if a significant proportion of experimental trials do not
yield improvements.
While this research provides a window on potential
mechanisms of change, these studies are based on a number of
assumptions regarding the nature of human behavior and
scientific research that challenge the interpretation of their
findings (5, 11, 12). These issues can be summarized in four
points. First, there is a lack of appreciation within current
research design that behavior continuously feeds back on sensory
input (such as when you move your head and eyes to continuously
changewhat you are perceivingwithin your surroundings). Second,
there is a lack of theories that acknowledge the continuous and
dynamic variation in behavior at the level of the individual, leading
to methods that artificially choose to “chunk” or average
measurements of behavior instead. Third, there is a disjunct
between making an inference about an internal mechanisms of
change in psychological therapies within an individual, and the use
of group statistics to research the efficacy of psychological therapies
on the “average” of a group of individuals, or to assesses statistical
trends in a variable (e.g., individual differences in a putative
mechanism of change) across a group of individuals. Mediation
analyses attempt to determine what variables are pertinent to
change. For example, mindfulness may have an effect on outcome
via rumination and worry (13). However, this approach examines
group statistics to understand individuals. An established line of
research on the relationship between self-efficacy on performance
has found this can lead toopposite relationships at the level of group
averages and individuals. Individual differences in self-efficacy
demonstrate a positive association with performance compared to
analyzing change in self-efficacy within individuals—where the
opposite relationship is shown to occur (14). Thus, studies of this
kind show that it is possible for group statistics to generate
erroneous conclusions regarding the processes occurring within
the individual.
Fourth, most theories of psychopathology and the mechanisms
of psychological therapies are described verbally. Even if they are
operationalized throughadiagram, this is rarely ina form that could
formaworkingmodel thatwouldbenecessary to test it against real-
world data (15).
The traditional approach to psychological therapy research
contrasts with progress of the physical sciences and engineering,
and to some extent biology. They have utilized functional model
building (16). For example, the theory of aerodynamics is used
within computer simulations to model the flight ability of a new
aircraft prior to manufacturing. The accuracy of these models is
extremely high, which is required in order to assure their
feasibility, safety and economic performance. With the fast
pace of development of both virtual reality and robotic
systems, there is now the potential for models of behavior and
cognition to be tested with similar precision (5).
HOWCANCOMPUTATIONALMODELING
PROVIDE ROBUST TESTSOF
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF THERAPY?
The computational modeling approach requires the mathematical
specification of a theory. The challenge this poses is how a theory of
psychological change can be described in mathematical terms. In a
key article on this topic, Moutoussis and colleagues (17) argue that
since psychological therapy requires learning, this allows the
computational understanding of learning to be applied to
psychological change in therapy. They go on to highlight how
learning and inference is central to how Cognitive Behavioral
Therapy (CBT) has been conceived from its development
onward. One example that Moutousssis and colleagues expand
on in their paper is the mapping of inferential distortions to
problematic beliefs (17). They provide an example of how a
computational model of avoidance learning can be applied to
understanding exposure and response prevention. This model
specifies key inferences about the outcomes of behavior as the
main variables in the models and can be compared to actual
behavior. We will return to the modeling of learning later in
the article.
There is also a body of earlier work that has focused on the
modeling of appraisal and affect that could be applied to
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psychotherapeutic change (18, 19). Some of these appraisal
models have extended their reach to artificially intelligent
systems and complex robotic devices (20). There are also
computational models of individuals that model the dynamic
relationship between constructs used in cognitive case
conceptualizations such as catastrophic thoughts, avoidance,
arousal, and cognitive restructuring (21, 22).
Returning to the suitability of computational modeling of beliefs,
there is indeedconsiderable evidence thatnegative, catastrophicor self-
critical beliefs are associated with self-reported distress (23). However,
there are also reasons to suggest that personal goals (values, principles,
standards, and ideals)maybemore fundamental. For example, there is
evidence that the content of intrusive experiences such as memories
(24) and auditory hallucinations (25) are closely associated with
personally valued goals, and that the degree of distress associated
with auditory hallucinations (26), and phobic avoidance (27) is
associated with how much they interfere with people’s more
important, self-definitional goals. As will be described below, another
way of conceiving psychological change is to consider it as loss and
restorationofcontrol.Wewill introduceandexplainperceptualcontrol
theory (PCT) because it provides a definition of control that specifies
biologically feasible, mathematical models of control that can be
applied to the complexities of themechanismof psychological therapy.
PCT is derived from control engineering (28), which in turn
had its basis within the homeostatic systems of the body (29).
According to PCT, control is the achievement and maintenance
of a variable at a preselected state through actions that counteract
disturbances to that variable (9). This is carried out through
circular feedback process between the individual and their
environment. The current perception of an aspect of the self or
environment (e.g., noise level) is compared to the reference value
for this variable (e.g., a quiet level). The discrepancy between the
two (the error), is amplified (by a gain factor) and drives actions
(e.g., to leave the room) that counteract disturbances (e.g., other
people talking loudly) to try to keep the variable at its desired
level. PCT proposes that we hold our reference values for a whole
range of perceptions of ourselves and the world, and that all our
actions are aimed at keeping these close to their preferred level—
their “just right” states. People are not necessarily conscious of
this process; indeed Powers (9) proposed that people are only
aware of a small number of perceptual variables that they are
controlling at any one time. It is also important to note that
reference values are not necessarily fixed, but can be altered
internally as necessary when circumstances change; we will discuss
thismechanismwhenwe introducehierarchies later on. Sometimes,
people are unable to keep perceived aspects of the environment in a
desired state because they do not have the resources (known as the
feedback function in PCT) to do so. These kinds of changes in the
environment are termed insuperable disturbances. These factors
would be beyond the individual’s control and experienced as
distressing. For example, it would not be possible to bring back to
life a deceased familymember, or for a neglected infant tofindmore
capable caregivers.
Figure 1 shows inmore detail the components of a single control
unit. This is the basic building block of the theory. The diagram
clarifies a number of features. Importantly, it shows the boundary
between the organism and the environment, with a clear indication
that the reference value (r) is situated inside the individual. It is set
by the output of another control unit that is situated on the level
above; in other words the individual can set and modify their own
goals. Within a control unit, an input function (Ki) transforms a
physical variable in the environment (Qi) into a perceptual input
(p). It is this perceptual signal that is controlled. First, it is subtracted
from the reference value to generate an error (e). This is amplified
by an output function (Ko) to transform it into an output quantity
(Qo) that acts in the environment. It acts via the feedback function
in the environment (Kf) that counteracts the disturbances in the
environment (D) to affect the input quantity such that p is kept as
close to r as possible.
PCT utilizes the Test for the Controlled Variable [TCV; (9)].
Mansell and Huddy (5) summarize this approach as follows:
“…the experimenter aims to set up a design in which
the perceptual variables that the participant controls
can be inferred by the effect of their actions the
controlled variable which is observed by the
experimenter … the experimenter needs to (a)
characterize the continuous array of perceptual
information that is available to the participant
through their senses (b) identify or provide the
means through which the participant has to control
their perceptual input within the environment, and (c)
identify or manipulate the disturbances to this
control.” (p. 310, 5).
These models have been applied across wide domains of
psychology. For example, they have been designed to closely
emulate tracking a cursor on a computer screen (30), movement
across a baseball pitch to catch a flyball (31), and selection of
work schedules for nurses (32). In each case, this evidence is
consistent with a PCT explanation of human behavior. An
important contemporary advance on these models is that they
can be used to reliably distinguish between individuals; a “control
profile” of each individual can be extracted, at least within the
domain of simple motor control (33). However, regardless of
whether these conclusions can be critiqued, there remains the
question of how models of this kind can be applied to the
complexities of change through psychological therapies.
THE CORE PRINCIPLES OF PCT INVOLVED
IN PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTRESS AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL CHANGE
A series of articles have begun to make the case that a PCT
explanation of psychological change is supported by existing
computational models (2, 34, 35). These accounts rely on three
additional principles within PCT that help to model how
psychological change occurs in therapy. These are hierarchies,
conflict, and reorganization.
The existence of hierarchies is possibly the simplest to
explain, because the concept of a hierarchy within the brain
Mansell and Huddy Perceptual Control Modeling
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and behavior is common across psychology and neuroscience
(36). It is also core to most theories of goals in psychology (37).
Hierarchies of control provide a way to organize the many
variables that a person strives to control in their life. It also
allows flexibility in terms of providing multiple means (lower
levels goals) to an end (higher level goal). Thus, Powers et al. (7,
8) proposed that control systems are organized in a cascading,
branching hierarchy with the more abstract, fundamental
variables (e.g., self-worth and honesty) toward the top, and the
more concrete, malleable variables toward the bottom (e.g.,
perception of proximity to another person, perception of
motion). By the 1990s, he had specified eleven levels of this
hierarchy through detailed introspection, and each level
potentially corresponds to specific fields of psychological
inquiry (e.g., sequencing, if-then programming, abstraction of
principles). The hierarchy is an essential component to
understand how the principles of conflict and reorganization
are applied to understand, and model, psychological change.
According to PCT, the psychological distress that entails that
a person seeks therapy is a manifestation of loss of control (6–8).
It is not, for example, the existence or conviction level of a
specific belief, or nature of the inferences that a person makes.
The loss of control maybe acute and extreme as in a panic attack,
insidious, and biological as in anorexia nervosa, morally
threatening such as in obsessions and compulsions, or
profound and existential such as in a psychotic breakdown.
There are a number of fundamental variables that any human
needs to control, and distress is experienced when these are in
error—when they deviate from their goal state or reference value.
For example, chronic physiological arousal would deviate from
the desired state of calmness. An important subset of these
fundamental variables are (unlearned) intrinsic variables—
those maintained by biological control processes in the brain
and body—such as body temperature, blood glucose, sleep-
activity states, and freedom from pain. Some of these variables
will be shared in common with other people, but each individual
will inevitably have a different range of controlled variables with
differing priorities. The loss of control maybe acute and extreme
as in a panic attack, insidious, and biological as in anorexia
nervosa, morally threatening such as in obsessions and
compulsions, or profound and existential such as in a
psychotic breakdown. Indeed, it may possible to map different
symptoms of mental health disorders onto specific levels of the
perceptual hierarchy. For example, within depression,
worthlessness would be experienced at a highest level—the
system concept; guilt would be experienced at the principle
level; and inability to plan and engage in everyday routines
would be experienced at the program level.
FIGURE 1 | Diagram of the control unit according to perceptual control theory. Permission granted from Dag Forssell, redrawn from an original figure by William T. Powers.
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People will also differ in terms of the degree of interference, or
conflict, between the variables they strive to control. For example,
in a study of hearing voices in clinical and non-clinical
participants, it was the interference between voice hearing and
an individual’s personal and uniquely specified goals that
corresponded with their distress about voice hearing, over and
above various properties of the voices (26). Indeed the diagnostic
label given to a person’s mental health problem may be in a large
part explained by the personally important realm of their life in
which they have lost control (12).
Following the above account, there are two ways in which
psychological distress can be alleviated: by directly enhancing
control, and by resolving conflict (35). One successful example of
a way to enhance control is to provide patients with the
opportunity to determine the timing, appointment scheduling,
session length, and duration of their psychological therapy (38).
Further successful examples include providing people with the
control of the topic of each therapy session (39), or providing
them with technology to exert moment-by-moment control of
their level of exposure during therapy (40).
Despite the success of addressing control problems directly,
helping patients in this way will not be sufficient to address
problems of conflict. According to PCT, the majority of cases of
chronic loss of control, and therefore long-lasting psychological
distress, can be traced to issues of conflict, whether between, or
within, individuals (9, 34). Conflict occurs when people attempt to
control two or more opposing standards for the same variable. In
the case of a specific phobia, for example, the patient may both
want to get closer to what they are afraid of in order to overcome
their fears and be a strong person, but at the same time want to get
further away in order to stop a catastrophic event such as being
harmed or humiliated (6). Yet, the experience that the person is
trying to control can be completely internal, such as the vividness
of memories. On the one hand, a traumatized individual may want
to forget their trauma to try to remain sane and get on with their
life, but on the other hand they may want to remember their
trauma in detail to be a credible witness in court and get justice.
It is notable that Powers’ (9) theory has been used to generate
a model of obsessive compulsive disorder (41). This model also
focused to the role of goal conflict in maintaining distress, but it
did not describe how the conflict would be resolved within
Powers’ (9) theory. It also suggested that there could be a
“faulty comparator” deficit at the heart of the condition. There
are a number of sophisticated neural network and robot models
that test deficit models of psychiatric disorders, and that do not
directly examine the process of psychological change that would
occur within therapy [e.g., (42, 43)]. In particular, given the
heritage of Lewis et al.’s (42) robot within Pitman’s (41) use of
PCT, it provides a good embodied grounding for future research
that might model the resolution of conflict through reorganizations.
The concept of conflict, and conflict resolution via insight,
has its origins at least as far back as the early psychoanalytic
theories (44, 45). Indeed, computational psychoanalysis has
formed its own recognizable discipline (46). However, unlike
PCT, the original psychodynamic theory does not provide the
formal structure required for computational modeling, and later
formalisms are used for computational modeling. Yet, in contrast
to psychoanalysis, conflict has had an operational definition
within PCT since its inception (7, 8), as the specification of
opposing reference values for the same perceptual variable; PCT
also provides a specified hierarchical architecture, the
mathematical specification of its components, and the learning
algorithms to model how conflict is resolved, as we elaborate
below. It is these kinds of conflicts that are target by a therapy
based on PCT, known as Method of Levels (47). Yet, according to
PCT, all effective psychological therapies work through resolving
conflict, but to varying levels of efficiency (12).
Conflict cannot be solved merely by helping a person to
control. The above clinical examples illustrate that actually, both
sides of a conflict may be important and worthwhile to the
individual—to be a strong person and to be safe; to stay sane and
to get justice (see Figure 2). The conflict cannot be solved by
helping to promote one side. Something novel and innovative
needs to occur. This is where reorganization comes in. Powers
and colleagues (7) adapted an idea from an early cybernetics
pioneer (48) and applied it to the PCT model. When loss of
control is experienced for any length of time, it engages a system
that creates trial-and-error changes to the properties of the
control system in error. In order to resolve conflict, these
changes need to be directed not at the two goals in conflict,
but above them, to the higher-level system that is setting the
reference values for the two goals. So, for example, the client who
is in two minds about whether to face their fears or continue to
avoid them, may ultimately, be trying to be a good husband and
father by staying safe and avoiding threat, and by being strong
and facing fears over time.
Reorganization is also the fundamental learning algorithm in
PCT. Outside PCT, learning is typically modeled as associative
learning or reinforcement learning. Within associative learning,
stimuli in the environment are associated with one another when
they have a temporal or contingent relationship with one another.
Within reinforcement learning, specific behaviors are reinforced
when they lead to increased reward or reduced punishment or
aversive experience in a pattern known as the reinforcement
schedule (49). There are highly reliable relationships between
responses and the reinforcement schedules being used in a given
experiment (50). From a PCT perspective, this is to be expected
because the organism is attempting to maintain the intake of
sustenance at the preferred reference level. Crucial to this from a
PCT perspective is that it is not the action that is reinforced but the
perceptual effects of action that the organism seeks to maintain.
Marken (51) used an experimental set up where bar pressed away
from the goal were equally likely to those toward the goal (i.e., all
responses were equally reinforced). Crucially, responses became
more likely as goal progress deteriorated, regardless of the specific
consequences of each action. Similarly, research on body
movements shows that preferred distance can be achieved by
flexion or extension regardless of the specific muscle movements
involved (52). Actions must vary rapidly when changes in the
environment occur which alter the effects actions have on the
environment [e.g., using a reversal learning task; (53)]. When such
changes in the reinforcement schedule occur, behavior has to vary
Mansell and Huddy Perceptual Control Modeling
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to ensure the preferred intake of sustenance is maintained. In these
circumstances, PCT utilizes a learning algorithm known as
reorganization. It works by generating random changes in the
parameters of control systems when error is sustained, until the
error is reduced to a near zero level (see later for more detail).
Behavior changes are observed during reorganization but no
specific stimulus-behavior associations are reinforced.
Nonetheless, the results of reorganization modeling lead to the
observations that most other researchers would describe as
instances of reinforcement learning (54, 55).
PCT proposes a specific pathway to the resolution of conflict
in practice, mediated by the focus of awareness. A client is given
the opportunity to talk about a problem. It is assumed that what a
client talks about is what is currently the focus of awareness, and
that significant, enduring error attracts awareness. Next, it is
proposed that while focusing on this problem, awareness shifts to
the “mid-level” goals in conflict that are responsible for this
lower level problem. The therapist can aid this process through
asking about disruptions indicating transient shifts in awareness
as the person is talking. Finally, and importantly, it is proposed
that awareness shifts and sustains on the high-level goal (or
control system) that is setting the two incompatible mid-level
goals. Once here, the therapist’s job is to help the client stay at
this higher level while reorganization has its effects. Because
reorganization operates through trial-and-error, it takes an
unspecified amount of time, and it may make changes that do
not improve control, until it ultimately reaches a higher level
organization that resolves the conflict and improves control,
thereby reducing distress. Figure 2 shows an example of how
goal conflict can be represented at three levels.
The above account is detailed, verbally described, and
somewhat linear in nature, going against some of the
recommendations we had in mind for the future of
psychotherapy research. Indeed, we have published studies that
support the above account, but they are based on subjective,
observer coding of the current focus of awareness in patients
receiving Method of Levels (56, 57). So, the question remains,
could such a sophisticated process, based on these four
principles, be testable through computational modeling? We
will first describe how these principles have been tested in
isolation, and then how they have been applied together to
more directly emulate psychological change.
OVERVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGY AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF PCT
COMPUTATIONAL MODELS
The methodology and implementation of the computational
models informed by PCT can be classified in various ways as
one moves from principle to practice. These features are
described and reviewed in detail for models of manual tracking
in a recent systematic review (58).
First, there is the question of whether the validity of the model
is judged by (a) its qualitative similarity to real-world data, (b) its
quantitative fit with real-world data and (c) its superior fit to
real-world data compared to a model informed by a competing
theory. In the sections to follow, we introduce some examples of
(a), many examples of (b), but very few studies have tested (c)
comparative validity.
Second, there is the question of which elements of PCT are
incorporated into the model. In most instances, the models
involve all of the functions, signals and quantities shown in
Figure 1. Some are often more detailed however; for example, the
delays of signals as they permeate around the loop may be
incorporated, and the output function may involve a gain
(amplification), a slowing function (such as a “leaky
integrator”) and other transformations to create the current
output quantity. Many computational models also involve
further elaboration going beyond the simple control unit—
hierarchies, conflict, and reorganization are not shown
FIGURE 2 | A diagram to illustrate the three levels involved in the loss of control due to unresolved conflict according to PCT. The top level contains a single higher level
system that sets two or more subgoals at the middle level. These subgoals send out conflicting references for a low level system that entails loss of control and instability
—in this case, the recall and suppression of trauma memories. Note that this model is simplified—there will be control systems intermediate between the “mid” and “low”
level, such as to “to be able to describe my trauma” and “to be a credible witness”, as a means to achieve justice through the recall of trauma memories.
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explicitly in Figure 1 and yet they form key components of the
theory (9).
Third, there is the question of which software is used to carry
out the modeling. The platforms vary widely and so we reference
here some key examples for further reading. First, some of the
earliest models were essentially algebraic equations [e.g., (30)].
Later, models used the “function” property of excel spreadsheets
to make iterative computations (59). Some groups of researchers
have used visual model-making platforms such as Vensim (32),
or they have created visualizable models through programming
code, such as C++ (54) or Matlab (33, 58). Finally, there bespoke
platforms that have the workings of a control unit pre-specified,
and the user creates a connected network of these units and
specifies the parameters. An example of a bespoke PCT platform
will be introduced later in this article.
SEPARATE COMPUTATIONAL MODELS
OF HIERARCHIES, CONFLICT, AND
REORGANIZATION
An earlier article summarized a number of computational
models of each of the principles we have described (2). First,
there are a number of PCT models that utilize a hierarchical
organization to model the control of physical variables. An early
study utilized a two-level hierarchy to model how human
participants controlled the relative distance of two lines on the
screen using two control handles (60). These movement of the
cursors utilized by these models was highly correlated with the
movements made by human participants, at a level close to r =
.99. A hierarchical model involving four levels has been used to
simulate the balancing of an inverted pendulum (61). Both of
these studies show the utility of hierarchical control, but they do
not show that it is necessarily superior to control without a
hierarchy in modeling human behavior. Within our research
group, we have produced initial evidence that this may be the
case. We designed a model of visual manual tracking that
required two levels—the control of proximity of a cursor to a
target was achieved by setting reference values for the velocity of
the cursor (62). We then optimized a different model to each of
24 participants’ data, and compared the fit to a single layer,
position control model. The hierarchical model was superior in
fit to a non-hierarchical proximity control model when the target
moved in a predictable (sinusoid) pattern, but similar in fit with a
less predictable (pseudorandom) pattern. Most recently, we have
confirmed that the PCT hierarchical model of the inverted
pendulum within a robotic device shows superior balance in
the presence of disturbances compared to two other popularly
used (non-hierarchical) controllers for the same robot (63).
A number of authors have modeled conflict to illustrate its
properties, and point to parallels in everyday human behavior
[e.g., (34, 54, 64, 65)]. For example, Carey (34) used models of
individual PCT agents initially designed to illustrate crowd
behavior [e.g., (66)]. One of these agents, A, had a goal to
move to a fixed location but to stay away from another agent,
B. B had a goal to get close to A. Carey (34) explored the effects of
a parameter known as gain, which is effectively the effort put in to
achieve one’s goals. At low levels of gain in both agents, there was
no evidence of conflict, with both agents reaching their goals.
However, when the gain of B was increased, A could not reach its
goal because it was blocked by B. This could illustrate the
suppression of one goal (e.g., to never feel angry) by another
(e.g., to express one’s anger). If, in turn, the gain of A was
increased, the two agents oscillated widely and vigorously,
potentially illustrating the loss of control that can come from
increasing one’s efforts. The remaining studies of conflict have
not interpreted their findings in the context of psychological
distress, but either in terms of social group behavior (63, 64), or
to illustrate more universal principles (54).
An early model of reorganization illustrated that it followed a
similar principle to that used by human participants to reach a goal
when only the timing of a trial-and-error change in behavior could
be controlled (66). Probably, the most sophisticated computational
models of reorganization published to date illustrated how it
reduces conflict and improves control within a simulated model
of an arm with 14 independent control systems governing the
movement at joints (54). At the start of the simulation, the control
systems interfered with one another. However, after a period of
reorganization in which the gain of each system is reset randomly
when error across the whole arm increases, they each converge to a
gain that counteracts any disturbances from other joints, and the
whole arm is able to smoothly execute its movement—one that
Powers selected from Tai Chi.
Powers (54) clearly illustrates the capacity for reorganization
to reduce error, but no attempts were made to quantitatively test
this model against real-world behavior. There are some key
parallels between observations of the trajectory of change that
is observed in models of reorganization and those observed in
studies of psychological therapy. The first is that the change
trajectory observed in psychological therapy follows a negatively
decelerating curve (67), which means that change is more likely
to occur earlier in therapy than later. One early meta-analysis
(68) suggested that given 75% of patients required 26 sessions for
a successful outcome, this was a “rational” time limit. However, it
is explicit that 75% of patients do not require this amount of
input. Indeed, others have observed that therapy gains are greater
in earlier sessions (69). Furthermore, this has led to the
suggestion that change is nonlinear, dynamic and complex
(70). However, the conclusion that change looks complex does
not mean it is generated by a complex system. Indeed, the
simulations reported by Powers (54) contain very few systems
interacting; yet, each iteration of a simulation generates a
different pattern of change, and takes different periods of time
to achieve stability.
As already noted, gains in therapy are most often observed
early in therapy (71). They also follow a discontinuous pattern,
appearing suddenly and unexpectedly in many cases. This has
been reported in naturalistic settings (72) and experimental
studies (73). One approach to psychotherapy change is the
dynamic system approach (74) that describes how client-
therapist dyads produce new information that results in the
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“reorganizing of behavior”, which can occur suddenly. However,
the algorithms underlying this model are arguably not
straightforwardly linked to psychotherapy change, as the
putative variables in the model are therapist interventions or
working alliance, which are distal to the client experience of
distress. The PCT account of therapeutic change considers
chronic error, maintained by conflict, to be the crucial variable
to simulate in modeling.
The PCT account of psychological distress is key for
developing a parsimonious method of implementing
computational models of psychotherapy change processes. The
core trans-diagnostic process of conflict maintaining error across
disorders has a clear implication: it means that a single approach
to modeling can be used across the themes that people describe
as problematic (e.g. , isolation, evaluation of others,
contamination, or maintaining weight). The account of
psychological distress described above points to chronic error
(loss of control) as crucial to understanding the underpinning
symptoms. On this basis, all varieties of symptoms can be
thought of as expressions of chronic error and, for this reason,
simulations based on PCT principles generate a fundamental
indicator of outcome—the magnitude of chronic error. If error is
equivalent to psychotherapy outcome, simulations can be used to
compare real-world therapeutic outcome with simulations based
on PCT and this may be done across diagnostic categories.
As noted earlier there are some well-established findings in
the psychotherapy literature of the trajectories of change, such as
early gains, sudden gains, and the negatively decelerating curve.
If error can be equated with outcome then it is possible to
compare these patterns of outcome with the trajectory of change
generated by models based on PCT principles. The model that
provides a starting point for this investigation is the “trial-and-
error” process described by Marken and Powers (66). The “trial-
and-error” process is acknowledged to be fundamental to
psychotherapy, as therapists are responsive to interventions
that are ineffective by moving to new strategies (75). However,
it is rarely acknowledged that clients are also exploring their
mental life in therapy sessions, generating new perspectives and
solutions; this is central to the PCT account of psychotherapy
change. However, the implications of “trial-and-error”
exploration for the trajectory of psychotherapy outcome have
not yet been examined.
As already noted, the simplest starting point is to assume their
symptom score at each session expresses the client’s current state
of error. Each session is assumed to provide an opportunity to
reorganize goals and generate novel solutions that reduce
chronic error. The simulation of iterative episodes of
reorganization has already been implemented in the PCT
model described by Marken and Powers (66) and can be
arranged to simulate changes in an outcome measure during
successive sessions in psychological therapy. Like Marken and
Powers (66), the model of therapy change can simulate
successive iterations of reorganization with each iteration taken
to reflect a “session” with severity of symptoms carried over from
the last. The model can be set up so the output of the system
changes to a greater extent when error is highest and less when
error is lower. The output of the system would be analogous the
activity people engage in when controlling a perception of, for
example, a sense of connectedness to others. Thus, exploration is
greatest when error is high. However, the exploration may be
focused on a specific perspective on the problem, for example,
thinking continually about how a social interaction might have
gone differently so that humiliation did not occur. The forgoing
account of the change process of therapy suggests that people can
be helped to direct this exploration to higher-level perceptions.
This verbal account of therapy can be cast as a computational
model where exploration is conceptualized as a trial-and-error
process constrained by the degree of error. On each “session”, the
there is a reference value for a desired amount of symptoms (zero),
and this is compared to current symptoms to generate an error
signal. This error signal tunes the amount of random change in
output (or behavior), greater error results in a higher chance of
change in the system and vice versa. The output then has an effect
on the environment that is either perceived as being either closer,
or further, from the desire state of the perception and so another
error signal is generated. In the model, error signal is taken to
reflect the level of “symptoms” and this is standardized to a clinical
dataset to observe the trajectory of change produced. Figure 3
demonstrates a simulation of CORE 10 scores in N = 5,613 “cases”
based on a starting point of the level of severity of symptoms taken
from data reported by Stiles et al. (71). As can be seen in Figure 3,
change is more likely early in the change process simulated by the
model than later, generating the negatively decelerating curve
described previously.
COMBINED COMPUTATIONAL MODELS
TO SHOW THE REORGANIZATION OF A
HIGHER-LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM
RESPONSIBLE FOR CONFLICT
While it is persuasive to see the qualitative parallels between the
behavior of models of principles, such as conflict and
reorganization, and the pattern of change in psychological
FIGURE 3 | The trajectory of CORE 10 scores for a simulation based on the
principle of reorganization. Original figure.
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distress, it does not directly test the specific mechanism thought
to mediate change according to PCT. There are two steps in this
advancement. First involves constructing a hierarchical model in
conflict that regains control through reorganization of the
higher-level system setting the two (or more) conflicting
subgoals. Second involves constructing and optimizing these
models for individual human participants and testing them
against the real-world data as each participant experiences
psychological change in therapy. Our research group has made
significant progress with the first stage, and we are building the
elements to carry out the second stage over the coming years.
In order to complete the first stage, we developed a bespoke
software platform using C++ to allow the user to construct
hierarchies of control systems that could be prone to conflict,
and that could employ reorganization (76). The coding for this
software is available from the first author, and second bespoke
platform is also available from perceptualrobots.com.
Our first study tested whether allowing reorganization
allowed two goals in conflict to regain control. It also tested
the key prediction of a PCT model of psychological change—
whether the restoration of control was more effective if the
reorganization was directed at the higher-level goal setting the
goals in conflict.
The control systems were constructed such that they would
simulate the parallel processing that occurs in the nervous
system, and they were refreshed every 16ms to allow dynamic
updating to occur across all systems simultaneously. The
experimenter optimized the parameters for each of the
components of a single control system (e.g., gains and
disturbances) so that this unit could control a single variable.
Next, two higher level systems were now added to set the
reference value for this system; the relative weighting
(connection strengths) of these two systems in setting the
lower level reference value was set randomly for 20 different
agents. Next, a third level system was added to the top and it had
two outputs—one setting the reference value for each of the two
mid-level units. Again, these two connection strengths were set
randomly for each of the 20 agents. In these simulations,
reorganization worked by selecting a new direction and value
of change in connection strength that was proportional to
increase in cumulative error (loss of control) over a specified
time window.
The study tested the degree of restoration of control in three
different conditions: no reorganization; reorganization of the
mid-level systems; and reorganization of the higher level system.
Akgonul (76) found, as predicted, that the agents who could
reorganize regained more control, and that this effect was
stronger when reorganization was limited to the higher-level
system. This finding was replicated using the same platform in
another study (77). The graphs of individual agents from this
study also reveal the patterns of observed change in
psychological therapy described earlier—the early response
pattern, and sudden gains during therapy (see Figure 4). Thus,
from a qualitative perspective, the PCT simulation shows similar
patterns of psychological change to those that have been
identified within individual patients.
A ROBUST COMPUTATIONAL MODEL OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL CHANGE ACCORDING
TO PCT
In order to prepare for the second stage and test a PCT model of
psychological change against real-world data, a number of steps
are required: (a) to identify an experience of psychological
distress for which a clinically meaningful controlled variable
can be easily measured, and for which a change would be
expected after therapy; (b) to construct a simulation of the
conflicted control systems governing this variable that can
reorganize in the way specified by PCT; (c) to build this model
and optimize it for individual participants; (d) to test the
optimized models of individuals against the real-world data
both before and after therapy.
We have selected spider phobia as the psychological problem
to investigate. It is common and therefore easy to recruit, and the
source of distress is relatively more circumscribed that other
anxieties. Furthermore, it is commonly accepted that the distance
that a person with spider phobia is willing to stand from a spider
is an appropriate index of their difficulties that reduces with
effective treatment (78). Yet, the control theory perspective on
approach and avoidance differs from the behavioral perspective
in explaining this process (see Figure 5). Specifically, “approach”
and “avoidance” are not regarded as learned responses to the
“stimulus” of a spider. Rather, according to PCT, the individual
attempts to control a range of perceptual variables that are
relevant to spiders, one of which is likely to be the desired
distance. The same individual can have two discrepant desired
distances from the spider. First, the defensive distance keeps the
spider at a distance perceived to be sufficiently safe, and a second,
closer distance, is set by higher level systems for goals such as “to
recover frommy phobia”, “to be strong”, or “to enjoy being in the
garden”. Thus, what appear to be discrete, triggered behaviors to
approach or avoid a stimulus are actually the oscillations
between two conflicting perceptual set points—one close to,
and one far away, from the feared entity—the spider in
this example.
Note. Traditional paradigms present a threat stimulus and
measure whether avoidance or approach is triggered in the
participant. A control theory perspective regards approach and
avoidance as the observable consequences of an individual who
has conflicting goals regarding their desired distance from an
object in the environment (that may or may not be feared).
Critically, when the defensive distance is greater than the
distance required to fulfill another important goal (e.g., to
overcome their fears; to spring clean their house; to return to
work, etc.) the person maintains a compromise distance and any
oscillation in behavior at each moment appears to the observer as
either approaching or avoiding the object. Relatively strong fears
in the context of weaker approach motivations would involve a
compromise distance that is closer to the defensive distance.
In order to assess the dynamic control of distance from a
naturalistically moving spider in real time, we have developed a
virtual reality paradigm in which the user can exert control over
their distance from a spider in a room (see Figure 6). We have
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also developed a goal interview to allow each participant to
report the importance of their conflicting goals with respect to
their goals to be far away from the spider versus to be close to it
(27). This interview also estimates the extent to which people
with spider fears are aware of their goal conflict. There are also
ways to attempt to assess goals and their conflicts using measures
such a goal matrices (80) and repertory grids of personal
constucts (81).
We plan to construct a separate three-level hierarchical model
for a large number of individuals with widely varying fears of
spiders (see Figure 7). The initial gains for the control systems in
conflict will be approximated as the importance ratings from the
goal interview. Then each hierarchy will be optimized to each
individual by training it on dynamic spider-distance data within
the virtual environment over a fixed session length. In the first
test of the validity of the model, we will measure its fit for each
participant to the movements in a second VR session, thereby
assessing the individual specificity of each model (33). Because
goal conflict is likely to occur in some participants, the kind of
exact match to behavior observed in tracking studies will not be
possible for every individual. Nonetheless, there will be ranges of
parameters for which behavior will be more predictable, for
example where one goal has a much higher gain and therefore
dominates the control of distance from the spider.
After establishing individual specificity, we aim to test the
PCT model of psychological change. As in Akgonul (76) and
Cooray (77), each hierarchy will be programmed to have the
capacity to reorganize. Owing to the stochastic nature of
reorganization, it will not be possible to assess the model fit
against moment-by-moment behavior. Therefore, our aim is to
FIGURE 4 | Graphs of change in overall error during the simulation in individual agents. The first pattern resembles the early response pattern found in patients, and
the second pattern resembles sudden gains during therapy (77). WMRSE is the Window Mean Root Squared Error. To calculate WMRSE, the squared error terms
across all control units are averaged over ten iteration cycles of the simulation, and then the square root of this figure is calculated.
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show whether incorporating reorganization into the model can
demonstrate the patterns of change that are shown within spider-
fearful individuals who are exposed to the spider within VR;
namely, the sudden reduction of distance from the spider after
reorganizing the higher-level goals driving the conflicted systems.
Indeed, our previous research has shown that people who report
greater awareness of goal conflict extracted through an interview
tend to approach closer to a spider after an exposure session (40).
FIGURE 5 | The behavioral perspective on avoidance contrasted with the control theory perspective (79).
FIGURE 6 | A static screenshot from the virtual reality environment within which each participant can control their distance from a naturalistically moving spider.
Original image.
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Therefore, we will optimize a reorganization parameter within the
model of each participant to assess whether it can lead to the same
pattern of approaching closer to the spider after the goal interview
that we record in participants.
LIMITATIONS, EXTENSIONS,
AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
We have described our plans to test a simplified model of
psychological change based on PCT. At present, it omits a
number of features that are nonetheless known to be involved
in psychological therapy and whose function is specified in PCT.
These are: the biological (intrinsic) control systems within the
individual; the physical environment within which action occurs;
the therapist (for a diagrammatic PCT model of the therapy
dyad, see 82); memories as perceptual goals (83); awareness (47);
and communication through language (84). Therefore, there still
remains a wide chasm between the details of a theory that can be
described, and the extent to which all of these can be reproduced
together within a faithful working model.
One novel solution to this issue is to use human actors to
simulate individual clients before, during and after therapy in a
manner similar to Stanislavski’s method of training actors [(85);
Scholte, personal communication]. This method involves inferring
a person’s multiple goals and their conflicts, acting according to
them within a situation, and revising these goals iteratively to
steadily improve the match to the script, or, in this case, the real-
world behavior. This approach has advantages in terms of the
potential complexity of goals that can be modeled, but it is clearly
not specifiedcomputationally, nor can it provide robust tests of how
the principles of a theory operate (e.g., reorganization).
This issue raises a further question around mechanism—not
only is it important to test a functionalmodel of the change process,
but it is also necessary to test whether the human brain can
implement this process, and if so, exactly how. There is likely to
be a specific neuranatomic circuit involved in this process of
resolving conflict: identification of conflict via the anterior
cingulate, and two cortical structures—the ventromedial frontal
cortex and orbital frontal cortex—that appear to be involved in
evaluating the appropriate decision during goal conflicts [e.g., (86)].
However, a realistic neuralmodel of this process thatmaps onto the
PCT architecture we have described remains a future challenge.
The approach we have described has potential for areas of
research into human behavior that extend beyond psychotherapy.
For example, Bowlby’s attachment theory involves a conflict
between exploration and safety-seeking, which can be specified as
perceptual goals. It comes much closer to PCT because it is based on
control systems theory, it involves interpersonal dynamics, and its
internal working models are essentially hierarchical and conflicting
control systems (87). The use of robots to model the dynamics of
child-caregiver interactions in earlier studies [e.g., (88, 89)] could be
extended to the interactions between therapist and client during
exposure, for example, and could be optimized to test against
behavioral data from humans. The fields of social and personality
psychology have also touched upon dynamic modeling, but could
be expanded upon (90). It is also feasible that research on robotics
could eventually utilize and test PCT models of psychological
change, involving memory and learning, following promising
work on simulating navigation and locomotion (91).
FIGURE 7 | A simplified diagram of the three-level hierarchy involved in spider phobia. The fearful individual fluctuates in their distance from the spider depending on
whether they are acting “to be strong” and get closer, or “to be safe” and get further away. However, when the same individual is provided with the opportunity to
talk about their conflict and shift and sustain their awareness to the level setting these goals—”to be myself”—this permits trial-and-error reorganization of the higher-
level system (e.g., sets different gains for each of the mid-level goals) such that the conflict is reduced and control increased.
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SUMMARY
We have described a novel and sophisticated methodology to test
the mechanism of psychological change within psychological
therapies. This approach requires the construction of
computational models that attempt to directly emulate the
psychological mechanisms occurring within each individual
client. We summarized the evidence to date, which is consistent
with a PCT account of psychological distress as chronic, unresolved
goal conflict held outside awareness. However, a robust evaluation
of this model requires a long-term research program that is
currently in progress. It is our view that researchers need to
become acquainted with this methodology and to start to develop
the skills and resources to use it, because it provides a feasibleway to
properly “understand the engine”ofpsychological change, andhow
best to engage and harness it within clinical practice.
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